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CVE-2021-26296: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Apache MyFaces
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From: Bill Lucy <wtlucy () apache org>
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2021 12:53:39 -0500
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Description:
In the default configuration, Apache MyFaces Core versions 2.2.0 to 2.2.13,
2.3.0 to 2.3.7, 2.3-next-M1 to 2.3-next-M4, and 3.0.0-RC1 use
cryptographically weak implicit and explicit cross-site request forgery
(CSRF) tokens. Due to that limitation, it is possible (although difficult)
for an attacker to calculate a future CSRF token value and to use that
value to trick a user into executing unwanted actions on an application.
This issue is being tracked as MYFACES-4373
Mitigation:
Existing web.xml configuration parameters can be used to direct MyFaces to
use SecureRandom for CSRF token generation:
org.apache.myfaces.RANDOM_KEY_IN_VIEW_STATE_SESSION_TOKEN=secureRandom
org.apache.myfaces.RANDOM_KEY_IN_CSRF_SESSION_TOKEN=secureRandom
org.apache.myfaces.RANDOM_KEY_IN_WEBSOCKET_SESSION_TOKEN=secureRandom
Credit:
Apache MyFaces would like to thank Wolfgang Ettlinger (Certitude Consulting
GmbH)
Regards,
Bill Lucy, MyFaces PMC
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Current thread:
CVE-2021-26296: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Apache MyFaces Bill Lucy (Feb 18)
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