In general, these flaws cannot be exploited through email in the Thunderbird product because scripting is disabled when reading mail, but are potentially risks in browser or browser-like contexts.
During iframe navigation, certain pages did not have their FeaturePolicy fully initialized leading to a bypass that leaked device permissions into untrusted subdocuments.
Concurrent use of the URL parser with non-UTF-8 data was not thread-safe. This could lead to a use-after-free causing a potentially exploitable crash.
By injecting a cookie with certain special characters, an attacker on a shared subdomain which is not a secure context could set and thus overwrite cookies from a secure context, leading to session fixation and other attacks.
When injecting an HTML base element, some requests would ignore the CSP's base-uri settings and accept the injected element's base instead.
Inconsistent data in instruction and data cache when creating wasm code could lead to a potentially exploitable crash.
This bug only affects Thunderbird on ARM64 platforms.
When saving or opening an email attachment on macOS, Thunderbird did not set attribute com.apple.quarantine on the received file. If the received file was an application and the user attempted to open it, then the application was started immediately without asking the user to confirm.
Mozilla developers Nika Layzell, Timothy Nikkel, Jeff Muizelaar, Sebastian Hengst, Andreas Pehrson, and the Mozilla Fuzzing Team reported memory safety bugs present in Thunderbird 102.2. Some of these bugs showed evidence of memory corruption and we presume that with enough effort some of these could have been exploited to run arbitrary code.