Cisco IOS® Software with support for Network Time Protocol (NTP) version (v4) contains a vulnerability processing specific NTP packets that will result in a reload of the device. This results in a remote denial of service (DoS) condition on the affected device. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. Workarounds that mitigate this vulnerability are available. This advisory is posted at http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20090923-ntp. Note: The September 23, 2009, Cisco IOS Security Advisory bundled publication includes eleven Security Advisories. Ten of the advisories address vulnerabilities in Cisco IOS Software, and one advisory addresses a vulnerability in Cisco Unified Communications Manager. Each advisory lists the releases that correct the vulnerability or vulnerabilities detailed in the advisory. Individual publication links are in "Cisco Event Response: Semiannual Cisco IOS Software Advisory Bundled Publication" at the following link: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/Cisco_ERP_sep09.html
Cisco IOS® Software with support for Network Time Protocol (NTP) version (v4) contains a vulnerability processing specific NTP packets that will result in a reload of the device. This results in a remote denial of service (DoS) condition on the affected device.
Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability.
Workarounds that mitigate this vulnerability are available.
This advisory is posted at http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20090923-ntp.
Note: The September 23, 2009, Cisco IOS Security Advisory bundled publication includes eleven Security Advisories. Ten of the advisories address vulnerabilities in Cisco IOS Software, and one advisory addresses a vulnerability in Cisco Unified Communications Manager. Each advisory lists the releases that correct the vulnerability or vulnerabilities detailed in the advisory.
Individual publication links are in "Cisco Event Response: Semiannual Cisco IOS Software Advisory Bundled Publication" at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/Cisco_ERP_sep09.html
Cisco IOS Software devices are vulnerable if they support NTPv4 and are configured for NTP operations. NTP is not enabled in Cisco IOS Software by default.
To see if a device supports NTPv4, log into the device and via configuration mode of the command line interface (CLI), enter the command ntp peer 127.0.0.1 version ?. If the output has the number 4 as an option, then the device supports NTPv4. The following example identifies a Cisco device that is running a Cisco IOS Software release that does support NTPv4:
Router#configure terminal Router(config)#ntp peer 127.0.0.1 version ? <2-4> NTP version number
The following example identifies a Cisco device that is running a Cisco IOS Software release that does not support NTPv4:
Router(config)#ntp peer 127.0.0.1 version ? <1-3> NTP version number
To see if a device is configured with NTP, log into the device and issue the CLI command show running-config | include ntp. If the output returns either of the following commands listed then the device is vulnerable:
ntp masterntp peer ntp server ntp broadcast client ntp multicast client
The following example identifies a Cisco device that is configured with NTP:
router#show running-config | include ntp ntp peer 192.168.0.12
The following example identifies a Cisco device that is not configured with NTP:
router#show running-config | include ntp router#
To determine the Cisco IOS Software release that is running on a Cisco product, administrators can log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner. The system banner confirms that the device is running Cisco IOS Software by displaying text similar to "Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software" or "Cisco IOS Software." The image name displays in parentheses, followed by "Version" and the Cisco IOS Software release name. Other Cisco devices do not have the show version command or may provide different output.
The following example identifies a Cisco product that is running Cisco IOS Software Release 12.3(26) with an installed image name of C2500-IS-L:
Router#show version Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm) 2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.3(26), RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2) Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport Copyright ©) 1986-2008 by cisco Systems, Inc. Compiled Mon 17-Mar-08 14:39 by dchih
The following example shows a product that is running Cisco IOS Software release 12.4(20)T with an image name of C1841-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M:
Router#show version Cisco IOS Software, 1841 Software (C1841-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M), Version 12.4(20)T, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc3) Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport Copyright ©) 1986-2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc. Compiled Thu 10-Jul-08 20:25 by prod_rel_team
Additional information about Cisco IOS Software release naming conventions is available in "White Paper: Cisco IOS Reference Guide" at the following link: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.
The following products and features are not affected by this vulnerability:
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability.
The Network Time Protocol (NTP) is a protocol designed to
time-synchronize a network of machines. NTP runs over UDP, which in turn runs
over IP. NTPv3 is documented in
RFC1305
.
NTPv4 is a significant revision of the NTP standard, and is the current
development version, but has not been formalized into an RFC at the time of
publication of this advisory. NTPv4 is currently documented in
draft-ietf-ntp-ntpv4-proto-11
When a Cisco IOS Software device supporting NTPv4 receives a specific NTP packet it will crash while creating the NTP reply packet. The NTP packet can be sent from any remote device, and does not require authentication. Cisco IOS devices supporting NTPv4 and configured with NTP peer authentication are still vulnerable. The device does not have to be explicitly configured for NTPv4 peers. For example a device configured with all NTP peers being explicitly labeled as version 2 would still be vulnerable, as shown in the following example:
Router#show running-config | include ntp ntp peer 192.168.0.254 version 2 ntp peer 192.168.0.1 version 2 Router#
For further information on the Cisco implementation of NTP, consult the configuration guide "Cisco IOS and NX-OS Software - Performing Basic System Management" at the following link: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/netmgmt/configuration/guide/nm_basic_sys_manage.html#wp1001170
This vulnerability is documented in the following Cisco Bug IDs: CSCsu24505 ( registered customers only) and CSCsv75948 ( registered customers only) and has been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2009-2869. Both Cisco bug IDs are required for a full fix to this vulnerability.
There are no workarounds other than disabling NTP on the device. The following mitigations have been identified for this vulnerability; only packets destined for any configured IP address on the device can exploit this vulnerability. Transit traffic will not exploit this vulnerability.
Note: NTP peer authentication is not a workaround and is still a vulnerable configuration.
Warning: Because the feature in this vulnerability utilizes UDP as a
transport, it is possible to spoof the sender's IP address, which may defeat
access control lists (ACLs) that permit communication to these ports from
trusted IP addresses. Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) should be
considered to be used in conjunction to offer a better mitigation solution.
!--- Configure trusted peers for allowed access access-list 1 permit 171.70.173.55 !--- Apply ACE to the NTP configuration ntp access-group peer 1
Warning: Depending on your NTP ACL configuration, be aware of Cisco Bug ID:
CSCsw79186
(
registered customers only)
- NTPv4 server treats NTPv3 client as a 'peer'.
For additional information on NTP access control groups, consult the document titled "Performing Basic System Management" at the following link: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/netmgmt/configuration/guide/nm_basic_sys_manage.html#wp1034942
Warning: Because the feature in this vulnerability utilizes UDP as a
transport, it is possible to spoof the sender's IP address, which may defeat
ACLs that permit communication to these ports from trusted IP addresses.
Unicast RPF should be considered to be used in conjunction to offer a better
mitigation solution.
Although it is often difficult to block traffic that transits a network, it is possible to identify traffic that should never be allowed to target infrastructure devices and block that traffic at the border of networks. Infrastructure ACLs (iACLs) are a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The iACL example below should be included as part of the deployed infrastructure access-list, which will help protect all devices with IP addresses in the infrastructure IP address range:
Vulmon
!---
!--- Feature: Network Time Protocol (NTP)
!---
access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 123
!--- Note: If the router is acting as a NTP broadcast client
!--- via the interface command "ntp broadcast client"
!--- then broadcast and directed broadcasts must be
!--- filtered as well. The following example covers
!--- an infrastructure address space of 192.168.0.X
access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
host 192.168.0.255 eq ntp
access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
host 255.255.255.255 eq ntp
!--- Note: If the router is acting as a NTP multicast client
!--- via the interface command "ntp multicast client"
!--- then multicast IP packets to the mutlicast group must
!--- be filtered as well. The following example covers
!--- a NTP multicast group of 239.0.0.1 (Default is
!--- 224.0.1.1)
access-list 150 permit udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
host 239.0.0.1 eq ntp
!--- Deny NTP traffic from all other sources destined
!--- to infrastructure addresses.
access-list 150 deny udp any
INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD eq 123
!--- Permit/deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in
!--- accordance with existing security policies and
!--- configurations. Permit all other traffic to transit the
!--- device.
access-list 150 permit ip any any
!--- Apply access-list to all interfaces (only one example
!--- shown)
interface fastEthernet 2/0
ip access-group 150 in
The white paper entitled "Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for infrastructure protection access lists and is available at the following link http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801a1a55.shtml
Warning: Because the feature in this vulnerability utilizes UDP as a transport, it is possible to spoof the sender's IP address, which may defeat ACLs that permit communication to these ports from trusted IP addresses. Unicast RPF should be considered to be used in conjunction to offer a better mitigation solution.
Control Plane Policing (CoPP) can be used to block untrusted UDP traffic to the device. Cisco IOS software releases 12.0S, 12.2SX, 12.2S, 12.3T, 12.4, and 12.4T support the CoPP feature. CoPP can be configured on a device to help protect the management and control planes and minimize the risk and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic that is sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. The CoPP example below should be included as part of the deployed CoPP, which will help protect all devices with IP addresses in the infrastructure IP address range.
!--- Feature: Network Time Protocol (NTP)
access-list 150 deny udp TRUSTED_SOURCE_ADDRESSES WILDCARD
any eq 123
!--- Deny NTP traffic from all other sources destined
!--- to the device control plane.
access-list 150 permit udp any any eq 123
!--- Permit (Police or Drop)/Deny (Allow) all other Layer3 and
!--- Layer4 traffic in accordance with existing security policies
!--- and configurations for traffic that is authorized to be sent
!--- to infrastructure devices
!--- Create a Class-Map for traffic to be policed by
!--- the CoPP feature
class-map match-all drop-udp-class
match access-group 150
!--- Create a Policy-Map that will be applied to the
!--- Control-Plane of the device.
policy-map drop-udp-traffic
class drop-udp-class
drop
!--- Apply the Policy-Map to the
!--- Control-Plane of the device
control-plane
service-policy input drop-udp-traffic
In the above CoPP example, the access control list entries (ACEs) that match the potential exploit packets with the "permit" action result in these packets being discarded by the policy-map "drop" function, while packets that match the "deny" action (not shown) are not affected by the policy-map drop function. Please note that the policy-map syntax is different in the 12.2S and 12.0S Cisco IOS Software trains:
policy-map drop-udp-traffic class drop-udp-class police 32000 1500 1500 conform-action drop exceed-action drop
Additional information on the configuration and use of the CoPP feature can be found in the documents, "Control Plane Policing Implementation Best Practices" and "Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.2 S - Control Plane Policing" at the following links: http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/coppwp_gs.html and http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t4/feature/guide/gtrtlimt.html
When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance.
Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) names a Cisco IOS release train. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (along with the anticipated date of availability for each, if applicable) are listed in the "First Fixed Release" column of the table. The "Recommended Release" column indicates the releases which have fixes for all the published vulnerabilities at the time of this Advisory. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. Cisco recommends upgrading to a release equal to or later than the release in the "Recommended Releases" column of the table.
|
Major Release |
Availability of Repaired Releases |
|
|---|---|---|
|
Affected 12.0-Based Releases |
First Fixed Release |
Recommended Release |
|
There are no affected 12.0 based releases |
||
|
Affected 12.1-Based Releases |
First Fixed Release |
Recommended Release |
|
There are no affected 12.1 based releases |
||
|
Affected 12.2-Based Releases |
First Fixed Release |
Recommended Release |
|
There are no affected 12.2 based releases |
||
|
Affected 12.3-Based Releases |
First Fixed Release |
Recommended Release |
|
There are no affected 12.3 based releases |
||
|
Affected 12.4-Based Releases |
First Fixed Release |
Recommended Release |
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Releases prior to 12.4(22)MD are not vulnerable, vulnerability was first introduced in 12.4(22)MD, first fixed in 12.4(22)MD1. |
12.4(22)MD1 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Releases prior to 12.4(20)T are not vulnerable. 12.4(20)T and 12.4(20)T1 are vulnerable, vulnerability is first fixed in 12.4(20)T2. 12.4(22)T is vulnerable, vulnerability is first fixed in 12.4(22)T1 12.4(24)T is not vulnerable. |
12.4(20)T4 12.4(22)T3 12.4(24)T2; Available on 23-OCT-2009 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(20)T4 12.4(22)T3 12.4(24)T2; Available on 23-OCT-2009 |
|
|
Vulnerable; first fixed in 12.4T |
12.4(20)T4 12.4(22)T3 12.4(24)T2; Available on 23-OCT-2009 |
|
|
Not Vulnerable |
||
|
12.4(22)YD1 |
12.4(22)YD1 |
|
|
12.4(22)YE1 |
12.4(22)YE1 |
|
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was discovered by Cisco when handling customer support calls.
To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and publications, see the Security Vulnerability Policy. This document also contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security vulnerability information from Cisco.
|
Revision 1.0 |
2009-September-23 |
Initial public release |
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
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