7.5
CVSSv3

CVE-2022-39255

Published: 28/09/2022 Updated: 30/09/2022
CVSS v3 Base Score: 7.5 | Impact Score: 3.6 | Exploitability Score: 3.9
VMScore: 0

Vulnerability Summary

Matrix iOS SDK allows developers to build iOS apps compatible with Matrix. Prior to version 0.23.19, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield. Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm. matrix-ios-sdk version 0.23.19 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages. Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added. This attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, so those who trust their home servers do not need a workaround. To avoid malicious backup attacks, one should not verify one's new logins using emoji/QR verifications methods until patched.

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Recent Articles

Matrix chat encryption sunk by five now-patched holes
The Register

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Four security researchers have identified five cryptographic vulnerabilities in code libraries that can be exploited to undermine Matrix encrypted chat clients. This includes impersonating users and sending messages as them. The researchers – Martin Albrecht (University of London), Sofía Celi (Brave Software), Benjamin Dowling (University of Sheffield) and Daniel Jones (University of London) – described their findings in a pre-print paper titled "Practically-exploitable Cryptographic Vulner...