The [`tj-actions/verify-changed-files`](github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an malicious user to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets. The [`verify-changed-files`](github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution. This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` which can be used by an malicious user to take over the [GitHub Runner](docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands, an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`. This has been patched in versions [17](github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/releases/tag/v17) and [17.0.0](github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/releases/tag/v17.0.0) by enabling `safe_output` by default and returning filename paths escaping special characters for bash environments.
| Vulnerable Product | Search on Vulmon | Subscribe to Product |
|---|---|---|
tj-actions verify-changed-files |
Vulmon